Addressing a case wherein a minor girl was subjected to sexual, the High Court held that,

In view of the changed definition of rape under Section 375 (b) of the IPC pari materia to Section 3(b) of the POCSO Act, sexual intercourse is not necessary to attract the ingredients of offence of rape or penetrative sexual assault.

An appeal was filed against the judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge whereby the appellant was convicted under Sections 363 and 366(A) of the Penal Code, 1960 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

Background

The mother of the prosecutrix had lodged an FIR stating that after coming back from work, her daughter (prosecutrix) (PW-2) informed her that she was having pain in her vagina.

Prosecutrix informed that the appellant took her to the dilapidated house and after laying her down on the ground, the appellant removed her underwear and thereafter committed sexual intercourse with her. In view of the said incident, an FIR was lodged by the mother.

Analysis and Decision

High Court noted that the prosecutrix a 5-year-old girl had deposed that the appellant took her to the dilapidated house and after laying her down disrobed her and also removed the clothes of her friend Dev, a minor.

Further, she stated that the appellant inserted his finger into her vagina and when she started weeping, the appellant left her. She narrated the whole incident to her mother and the mother found her private part swelled and red.

PW-4 examined the prosecutrix and found that the redness was present at the pelvic region and hymen was freshly torn and the tip of the finger could be entered into the vagina. She concluded that the injury was caused by a hard and blunt object.

Considering the definition of rape under Section 375(b) of the Penal Code, 1860 and also the corresponding pari materia Section 3(b) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 defining penetrative sexual assault, as also Sections 4, 5, 5(m), 6 of the POCSO Act, it was observed that the Trial Court after evaluating the entire evidence in a proper manner, rightly convicted the appellant under Section 363 and 366 of the IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

Hence, in view of the above, the trial Court’s decision was not liable to be interfered with.

The appeal was dismissed.